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USING TINKER TO REGULATE OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT 
CYBERBULLYING 
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“It lowers my self esteem. It makes me feel really crappy. It makes me walk 
around the rest of the day feeling worthless, like no one cares. It makes me very, 
very depressed.”
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 1. Share Your Cyberbullying Story, http://www.cyberbullying.us/shareyourstory.php (last visited Mar. 3, 
2009) (chronicling the experiences and feelings of real-life victims of cyberbullying). 
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INTRODUCTION
Everyone remembers the school bully from their childhood years, even if they 
were never a victim themselves.  He was the one who was unbelievably large for 
his age and surrounded by myths of flunking several grades, or who picked on the 
first graders by the monkey bars on the playground, or the popular student who 
spread rumors about classmates.2  His victims could only escape him by retreating 
to the refuge of their home as soon as the final school bell rang.   
However, the Columbine shootings led to massive changes to how the law 
deals with incidents of so-called “traditional bullying.”3  In the ten years since that 
tragedy, advancements in technology have changed interactions among students.  
Instead of rushing to the playground and local restaurants after school, today’s stu-
dents “meet up” with their peers on social networking websites, such as MySpace 
 ________________________  
 2. It is not the author’s view that all bullies are male; he is merely being used for simplicity.
 3. Many states have adopted some version of an anti-bullying statute. For instance, Louisiana defines 
bullying as:  
[A]ny intentional gesture or written, verbal, or physical act that . . . [a] reasonable person . . 
. should know will . . . harm[ ] a student or . . . plac[e ] a student in reasonable fear of harm 
to his life or person or damage to his property; and  . . . [i]s so severe, persistent, or perva-
sive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for a 
student. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (2006). This is similar to many states’ anti-bullying laws.  See, e.g., IND. CODE 
ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (West 2006); W. VA. CODE R. § 18-2C-2 
(2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (2009).  Only nine states, however, include provisions in their bullying code to 
sufficiently handle cyberbullying and other online harassment.  See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-514 (2007) (stating 
bullying can occur by a “written, verbal, electronic, or physical act”); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32261 (West 2009)
(including bullying by electronic acts); (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2009) (asserting that bullying could occur 
by telephone, or computer, or internet); IOWA CODE § 280.28 (2007) (including electronic acts in its definition); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (West 2008) (including “cyberbullying” in its definition); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
121A.0695 (West 2009) (including electronic acts in its definition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.3 (West 
2009) (including electronic communications); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.356 (West 2009) (including cyberbully-
ing in its definition); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-120 (2006) (also including electronic acts in its bullying definition).  
Three other states allow schools to punish cyberbullies, but only for intentional acts, which does not adequately 
protect student victims.  See infra Parts III.D.2 and IV.B; see also MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424 (West 2009); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West 2009). An additional four states 
allow schools to intervene only if the cyberbullying occurs on the school grounds or computers, which also fails to 
protect student victims, and account for the fact that most cyberbullying occurs off-campus.  See infra Parts III.C 
and IV.B.2.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-2, 137 (LexisNexis 
2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2007); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2008).  
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and Facebook, and instant messaging programs.4  In response to this constant 
availability of technology, bullies have adapted their tactics to the times, giving rise 
to an emerging problem known as cyberbullying.5   
For example, Ryan Halligan, a seventh grader, was tormented online in the pri-
vacy of his own living room by schoolmates who used instant messaging software 
to mock and ridicule him, causing him to take his own life.6  Eighth grader Jeff 
Johnston also committed suicide after a group of hackers destroyed an online game 
that he had invented and replaced it with a website full of malicious comments 
about him.7  Kylie Kenney was forced to change schools after a group of class-
mates created a website entitled “Kill Kylie Incorporated.”8  Those students also 
sent her harassing emails and phone messages, and used instant messaging to 
spread rumors that she was a lesbian.9     
The continuous access to other students and the anonymity offered by these 
technologies has created a constant problem both for school administrators, in try-
ing to prevent cyberbullying and discipline perpetrators, and for victims, who are 
just as vulnerable at home as they are in school.10  The law has failed to keep pace 
with today’s technology, and is currently inadequate to protect victims of cyberbul-
lying.11  Until a nationwide cyberbullying regime is implemented, courts need to 
give schools the authority to constitutionally intervene in cyberbullying incidents 
and punish perpetrators, even when such acts occur off campus in the living rooms 
of the students.12   
Accordingly, Part I of this paper will define cyberbullying and discuss its ef-
fects on victims.  Next, Part II will discuss the free speech rights of students as it 
stands today.  Part III will then examine the current ambiguous state of the law 
addressing cyberspeech and off-campus student speech.  Finally, Part IV will dis-
 ________________________  
 4. Frontline: Growing Up Online (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2008) (calling social network sites 
the “hub” of teenagers’ social lives); see also ROBIN M. KOWALSKI ET AL., CYBER BULLYING: BULLYING IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE, 3 (2008) (referring to the Internet as the “digital communication backbone of teens’ daily lives”).
5. See Growing Up Online, supra note 4 (chronicling how technology has changed the lives of today’s
students); see also KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 3-5 (describing how technology has led to the problem of cyberbul-
lying). 
6. See Growing Up Online, supra note 4.  Ryan’s father details how Ryan’s online “friends” from school 
spread rumors about Ryan being gay, how a girl Ryan liked pretended to return his affection so she could later 
humiliate him,  and how when Ryan told a friend he was going to commit suicide, the friend responded, “It’s about 
[expletive] time.”  Id.   
 7. Laird Harrison, Special Report: Cyberbullying, http://www.ahealthyme.com/topic/cyberbullying (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
8. Suzanne Struglinski, Schoolyard bullying has gone high-tech, DESERET NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006, availa-
ble at http://deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,645194065,00.html. 
9. Id.  Kylie noted that she felt “‘ashamed, humiliated and scared.’”  Id.
10. See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 35-37 (describing what school administrations are attempting to do to 
prevent cyberbullying); see also Growing Up Online, supra note 4 (interviewing Anne Collier, the author of MyS-
pace Unraveled, who stated that “there are so many devices [students] can use to connect, there are so many hot 
spots and friends’ houses and libraries and cafes and schools and all these places where they can go on line where 
we can’t control them”). 
 11. See supra note 3, noting that only nine states’ anti-bullying statutes include a definition of bullying that 
would adequately allow schools to intervene in student cyberbullying incidents.  See also infra Part III for a dis-
cussion on the inconsistency of court decisions regarding cyberbullying.  
 12. This nationwide regime should be similar to that in place for traditional bullying.  See discussion supra
note 3 on the different state anti-bullying statutes.  
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cuss how courts can empower schools to prevent and stop student cyberbullying 
using the Tinker test.13  Utilization of the Tinker analysis will give school adminis-
trators and courts a workable and well-developed test for determining whether or 
not schools can curtail student cyberbullying, even when such speech occurs off 
campus. 
I. CYBERBULLYING EXPLORED
A.  Defining Cyberbullying 
Cyberbullying is such a newly recognized phenomenon that there is no current 
consensus on whether it is one word or two words, let alone what it entails.14  De-
spite an absence of widespread knowledge on the subject, cyberbullying is ex-
tremely prevalent among today’s school children, with several studies reporting 
that approximately eighteen percent of students are cyberbullied during a two-
month period.15   
But before one can understand the trouble courts are having in deciding how to 
regulate cyberbullying, it is important to understand what it entails, and how it dif-
fers from traditional bullying.  Most courts and commentators agree that it is a very 
narrow part of cyberspeech, which is yet another developing area.16  In general, 
cyberbullying can be described as the use of technology to humiliate, embarrass, or 
otherwise bully another.17  Today’s child has numerous technologies at their dis-
 ________________________  
 13. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was the first decision by the U.S. Su-
preme Court discussing student free speech rights, and held that schools could discipline students for speech that 
was materially and substantially disruptive or impinged on the rights of other students.  393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).  
See also infra Part II-A. 
 14. Many variations in spelling are seen across articles on this topic, including cyber bullying, cyberbully-
ing (as used in this Article), and cyber-bullying. 
 15. Robin M. Kowalski & Susan P. Limber, Electronic Bullying Among Middle School Students, Vol. 41, 
Iss. 6, Supp. 1 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S22, S28S26 (2007).  Of those, 52% were cyberbullied by a known 
schoolmate, and another 36% reported that the cyberbully was a friend.  Id.  This data reinforced the results of 
another study conducted in 2000, where 19% of the school-age children reported being the victims of cyberbully-
ing within the prior  year.  Michelle L. Ybarra & Kimberley J. Mitchell, Online aggressor/targets, aggressors, and 
targets:  A comparison of associated youth characteristics, 45 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 1308, 1311-
12 (2004).  However, another survey, albeit less scientific and controlled than the others cited in this footnote, 
reports currently 52% of those polled have been cyberbullied.  Wired Safety Cyberbullying Poll, 
http://www.wiredsafety.org/cgi-bin/survey/survey.cgi?survey_name=site (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).  This in-
crease may be due to its location on a website devoted to stopping cyberbullying, which would likely attract more 
cyberbullying victims.   
 16. Cf. Christopher E. Roberts, Note, Is MySpace Their Space? Protecting Student Cyberspeech in a Post-
Morse v. Frederick World, 76 MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1177, 1188-89 (2008) (naming cyberbullying as an area of 
cyberspeech which that author believes should be governed by an intent test). See also infra Parts III.D.2 and 
IV.B.2 for more discussion on the intent test and cyberbullying. 
 17. Darby Dickerson, What is Cyberbullying?, 29 NAPSA LEADERSHIP EXCHANGE 28, 28 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.leadershipexchange-digital.com/leadershipexchange/2009spring/?pg=31.  All the definitions 
have similar elements in common to the definition provided in this Comment.  See, e.g., Stopcyberbullying.org, 
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (defining cyber-
bullying as “when a child, preteen or teen is tormented, threatened, harassed, humiliated, embarrassed or otherwise 
targeted by another child, preteen or teen using the Internet, interactive and digital technologies or mobile 
phones”); KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 1 (defining it as “bullying through e-mail, instant messaging (IM), in a chat 
room, on a Web site (sic), or through digital messages or images sent to a cellular phone”). 
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posal that they can employ to perpetrate acts of cyberbullying.18  Among others, 
these include text messages, emails, chat rooms, instant messages, social network-
ing sites, other websites, and cell phones.19  These technologies give cyberbullies 
perpetual access to their victims, and the ability to hide their true identities.20
One notable difference between many cyberbullying definitions is an age ele-
ment.21 While some definitions and scholars specify that cyberbullying describes 
behavior between two adolescents, others use the term to describe incidents be-
tween two adults, or between an adult and adolescent.22  Indeed, what is perhaps 
the most notorious case of cyberbullying involved the suicide of thirteen-year-old 
Megan Meier, after she was tormented on MySpace by forty-nine-year-old Lori 
Drew.23   
Cyberbullies, like traditional bullies, use multiple methods to accomplish their 
ends, some more violent than others.24  Flaming is one such technique, involving a 
short online argument between two or more persons trading insults while using 
offensive language.25  It often occurs in chat rooms, on discussion boards, or on 
virtual game websites.26  Harassment involves the one-sided sending of offensive 
 ________________________  
 18. See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 1-3, 46 (delineating the different technologies accessible to today’s 
generation of students and how they affect students’ lives).
 19. See NANCY WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS 17-26 (2007) (discussing the various 
digital technologies which can be used to cyberbully). 
 20. See id.
 21. See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 43 (noting that “[t]here is also confusion surrounding the ages at which 
cyber bulling may take place.”).
 22. Compare, e.g., Stopcyberbullying.org, 
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (stating that 
cyberbullying “has to have a minor on both sides”) with Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frede-
rick and the Regulation of Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 867 (2008) (noting that common 
cyberbullying cases “involve students posting comments critical of school administrators and teachers to personal 
webpages or social networking sites”) and Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District 
Jurisdiction to Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 265-66 (2008) (listing a 
“quartet” of cyberbullying cases, three of which involved student speech directed towards a teacher or administra-
tor).  See also KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 43 (stating that when an adult is involved, the incident should be called 
cyber-harassment and not cyberbullying).
 23. See, e.g., Parents: Cyber Bullying Led to Teen’s Suicide,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Story?id=3882520, (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).  Lori Drew created a fake MySpace 
profile masquerading as a sixteen year old boy named Josh who befriended Megan and tricked her into thinking he 
liked her.  Id.  Drew wanted to get back at Megan for getting into a fight with her daughter.  Id.  After Megan 
began to like Josh, he told her the world would be better off without her, that she was fat and ugly, and that she 
was not a nice person.  Id.  Megan killed herself that night.  Id.  Drew was convicted of three misdemeanor counts 
of computer fraud.  Jennifer Steinhauer, Verdict in MySpace Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 27, 2008), at A25, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/us/27myspace.html.  This conviction was later tentatively dis-
missed by a federal district court judge.  See, e.g., Tom McCarthy & Scott Michels, Lori Drew, MySpace Suicide 
Hoax cConviction Thrown Out, ABCNEWS.COM, July 2, 2009, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=7977226&page=1.
 24. See, e.g., KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 46 (noting that, like traditional bullying, cyberbullying occurs in 
varying extremes, and is sometimes harder to identify than others); WILLARD, supra note 19 at 5 (stating that 
categories of cyberbullying often “overlap or [are] interrelated”).
 25. See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 47.  Willard, however, questions whether this category should be 
included as cyberbullying, since bullying is generally categorized by behavior over time, instead of the short-lived 
disputes characteristic of flaming.  WILLARD, supra note 19, at 5.  
 26. See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 47. 
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messages to a targeted individual over a period of time.27  It usually occurs over 
email, instant messaging, and text messaging.28  Denigration is the dissemination of 
cruel, harmful information about a target, where the target is generally not the reci-
pient of the information.29  This information is usually spread over email, instant 
messaging software, or posted online at a website.30  Impersonation occurs when a 
cyberbully gains access to the victim’s password, logs on to one of the victim’s
accounts, and sends out hurtful messages or posts hateful comments purporting to 
be the victim.31  Another method, outing and trickery, involves the cyberbully pre-
tending to befriend the victim in order to learn personal, and often embarrassing, 
information which the victim believes will be kept private, and then spreading that 
information to others.32  Finally, exclusion/ostracism is when the cyberbullying 
victim is purposefully excluded from groups, chat rooms, or websites, due to a 
change in password, omission from a buddy list, or from being ganged up on by 
other members.33
A related concept is that of cyberbullying by proxy, which occurs when the cy-
berbully gets a third party to do the bullying for him or her.34  Often, the third party 
is unaware that he or she is being used to cyberbully a victim.35  Unsurprisingly, 
some forms of cyberbullying by proxy overlap with the cyberbullying methods of 
denigration and impersonation.  For instance, the cyberbully can enlist the third 
party to send harassing emails or instant messages from the victim’s personal ac-
counts, or the cyberbully can hack into the third party’s accounts and use those 
accounts to transmit attacks.36  More commonly, however, the cyberbully will get 
others to engage the victim in “Notify Wars,” where the accomplices press a “noti-
fy” or “warning” button in the software, which will wrongly alert the victim’s in-
stant messaging service, chat room, or email server that the victim is writing objec-
tionable content.37  Once the service or chat room administrator receives a certain 
number of warnings, the victim’s account is terminated.38  Cyberbullying by proxy 
can also occur when the cyberbully urges the others to send harassing messages to 
the victim.39  The cyberbully provokes the victim until the victim responds, either 
in an emotional or harassing message, email, or some other form.  The cyberbully 
 ________________________  
 27. See WILLARD, supra note 1919, at 6-7.  Note that harassment involves one or many protagonists, but a 
victim who does not send offensive messages back.  Id.  This distinguishes harassment from flaming, where both 
sides send offensive messages.  Id.
 28. Id.
 29. Id. at 7.  Examples include sending digitally altered photographs or websites targeting a specific stu-
dent.  KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 48.  Kylie, from the Introduction, was the victim of denigration.  See supra note 
9 and accompanying discussion. 
 30. See WILLARD, supra note 19, at 7-8. 
 31. See id. at 8.  Willard points out that the cyberbully does not necessarily steal the password, noting that 
it is common practice among teen girls to exchange passwords as a pledge of friendship.  Id.
 32. Id. at 9.  It is this method by which Ryan Halligan from the Introduction was tormented by numerous 
cyberbullies, including a girl he liked.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 33. See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 49-50. 
 34. Darby Dickerson, Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 51, 59 (2005). 
 35. KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 44. 
 36. Id. at 45. 
 37. Id. at 44. 
 38. Id.
 39. Dickerson, supra note 34, at 59. 
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then forwards the victim’s response on to either friends, to embarrass the victim, or 
to an authority figure, in an attempt to get the victim in trouble.40
B. Differences Between Cyberbullying and Traditional Bullying 
In the aftermath of the Columbine tragedy, the mindset of the public towards 
bullying changed from being begrudgingly tolerant to actively preventing bullying 
from occurring.41  Ironically this same earlier tolerance of traditional bullying is 
prevalent again today in incidents of cyberbullying.42  Cyberbullying shares three 
common characteristics with traditional bullying:  it is aggressive, it involves an 
imbalance of power between the players, and the bullying is repeated over a period 
of time.43  However, differences in how these characteristics play out in a cyberbul-
lying event makes cyberbullying more difficult to regulate than traditional bully-
ing.44
Traditional bullying usually involves a physically stronger bully and a weaker 
victim.45 However, technology enables an otherwise powerless child to subject a 
physically stronger or older child to fear and abuse that the cyberbully would be 
unable to assert in a face-to-face confrontation.46  Technology can also obstruct a 
victim’s ability to trace the comments back to the bully.47  Thus, a cyberbully, un-
like a traditional bully, can use technology to hide behind anonymity and inspire 
additional fear.48  Cloaked by this anonymity, the cyberbully is enabled to say 
harsher, more destructive things than a traditional bully due to his physical removal 
from the situation.49  Since tone, inflection, and facial expression are lacking in 
 ________________________  
 40. Id.
 41. See Erb, supra note 22, at 259 (averring that “[t]he viewpoint that harassment and bullying by one’s
peers is relatively harmless and a rite of passage for school children changed drastically” after the Columbine 
shootings).   Horrified viewers were glued to their television for days after the Columbine shooting, and outraged 
that the two teen shooters supposedly committed this horrendous act in response to being victims of bullies at 
school.  See id.; see also Stephanie Chen, Debunking the Myths of Columbine, 10 Years Later, CNN, Apr. 20, 
2009, available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/20/columbine.myths/.  In response to this outrage, 
schools have enacted numerous measures to make students safer, and have petitioned for stronger bullying statutes 
to allow schools to intervene in bullying incidents.  Kathy Bushouse & Marc Freeman, Columbine made schools 
take notice on 10-year anniversary, Safety now paramount, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 2009, at B1.
 42. See, e.g., Jonathan Stayton, Cyber bully drove schoolboy to attempt suicide, THE ARGUS, Feb. 18, 
2008, available at http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/2053716.cyber_bully_drove_schoolboy_to_attempt_suicide  
(stating that the cyberbully told all of his friends and teachers of his attacks about a fellow student yet no one 
intervened).  Similarly, Ryan Halligan’s classmates were aware he was being cyberbullied, but did nothing to stop 
it.  See Growing Up Online, supra note 4. 
 43. KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 61-62. 
 44. Id.
 45. Id. at 62. 
 46. Id. (noting that “a child who might wield little power over a victim face-to-face may wield a great deal 
of power . . . in cyber space”).
 47. Id. at 65.   
 48. Id.   
 49. See Glenn Stutzky, Stutzky’s Cyberbullying Information, 
http://www.ippsr.msu.edu/Documents/Forums/2006_Mar_ CYBER_BULLYING_INFORMATION_2006%20--
%20Provided%20by%20Mr.%20Glenn%20Stutzky.pdf http://glennstutzky.com/id14.html (last visited Mar. 11, 
2009) (stating that “[i]f I’m bullying you face to face I can see the impact it’s having on you . . . and I might back 
off and end it seeing that I’ve got you good.  This technology removes me from being able to see the impact of my 
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online conversations, a cyberbully might not even be aware of the harm he or she is 
unintentionally causing the victim.50
Additionally, while traditional bullying involves multiple, separate acts be-
tween the players, one act of cyberbullying can be spread over and over again to 
thousands of people, and cause far more damage.51  Degrading comments posted 
online are accessible to people across the globe, including relatives, friends, and 
future employers, who may mistake the cyberbullying comments as truth.52  While 
acts of traditional bullying are instantaneous, and can be easily forgotten by ob-
servers over time, cyberbullying acts posted on the Internet spread rapidly and are 
left up for a potentially infinite length of time, increasing the duration of the acts, 
and causing an extended period of embarrassment and shame.53
It is not uncommon for victims of cyberbullying to also be victims of tradition-
al bullying during school hours.54  But, unlike the victims of traditional bullying, 
cyberbullying victims have no safe haven to run home to after school.55  Because 
students are constantly accessible to each other via the Internet and cell phones, a 
cyberbully can reach into the victim’s own living room to torment him or her.56
Further, where a bully at school must operate under the watchful eyes of teachers, 
lunchroom monitors, and other faculty, there is no one supervising his or her ac-
tions in cyberspace.57  There is no one to punish the cyberbully, except for his or 
her parents, who may be blissfully unaware of their child’s online activities.58
actions and so lends itself to greater cruelty”).  See also KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 65 (referring to this as “the 
phenomenon of disinhibition”).
 50. See, e.g., id. at 65 (including the comments of one child who describes how you can become an acci-
dental cyberbully by thinking you are making a joke and inadvertently hurting someone’s feelings due to the lack 
of tone and expression).  Likewise, it is almost certain that no cyberbully, or traditional bully, would intend to 
cause death, or suicidal ideations, such as those experienced by many victims.  See supra notes 6-9 and accompa-
nying text. 
 51. See  KOWALSKI, supra note 4 at 62 (stating that although “there may have been only one initial [cyber-
bullying] act, it may have been perpetrated through many people and over time”).
 52. See, e.g., CBC News In Depth:  Cyberbullying, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/bullying/cyber_bullying.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009)  One victim de-
scribed the humiliation from having such an increased audience: 
Rather than just some people, say 30 in a cafeteria, hearing them all yell insults at you, it’s up there for 6 billion 
people to see. Anyone with a computer can see it . . . . And you can’t get away from it. It doesn’t go away when 
you come home from school. It made me feel even more trapped.  
Id.
 53. See, e.g., Stutzky, supra note 49 (noting that cyberbullying “lengthens the duration of . . . torment” 
compared to traditional bullying). 
 54. See, e.g., Carroll, infra note 77 (describing the plight of a high school girl who was the victim of cyber-
bullying at home, and “berated . . . in person during school hours”).
 55. See Bob Meadows, The Web: the Bully’s New Playground, PEOPLE, Mar. 14, 2005, at 153 (emphasiz-
ing the difficulty cyberbullying victims have in escaping the perpetrator).  The mother of a cyberbullying victim 
aptly described that “[w]hen [the bullying] is on the computer at home, you have nowhere to go.” Id.
 56. See Mike Wendland, Cyber-bullies make it tough for kids to leave playground, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 
17, 2003, at 1A (describing the accessibility of today’s teens due to the technology available to them). 
 57. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Fact Sheet:  What You Need to Know About On-
line Aggression 1, 2 (2008), available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_fact_sheet.pdf (stating that 
“supervision is lacking in cyberspace”).
 58. See id. (noting that the lack of supervision renders many incidents of cyberbullying “outside of regula-
tory reach”).  According to one survey, although ninety-three percent of parents think they know what their child 
is doing online, approximately forty-one percent of children reported that their parents didn’t know what activities 
they did online.  KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 91.  Kowalski points out that parents are often not members of social 
8
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While some may argue that the victim could escape merely by turning off her 
cell phone or signing offline, this is not the reality for today’s students.  Technolo-
gy has become so entwined with teenage lives, as a vehicle for both completing 
schoolwork and hanging out with friends, that logging off is simply not a viable 
option.59  Thus, cyberbullies effectively “have their victims on an electronic teth-
er.”60
Perhaps surprisingly, while boys are generally the perpetrators and victims of 
traditional bullying, it is girls who are more likely to be on both ends of cyberbully-
ing.61  However, it appears that the boys who cyberbully others do so more fre-
quently than their female counterparts.62  Cyberbullying also peaks during the mid-
dle school years, while most traditional bullying occurs during elementary school 
years.63
An intriguing difference between cyberbullying and traditional bullying is the 
role that bystanders play.  Traditional bullying is witnessed by a number of bys-
tanders who play a variety of different roles.64  While some bystanders might be-
come accomplices and assist in the bullying, others may try to help the victim get 
out of the situation.65  Another group may indirectly engage in the bullying by 
laughing, egging the bully on, or otherwise reinforcing the bully’s behavior.66  The 
largest group of bystanders will likely witness the event silently without assisting 
either side or reporting the bullying to a teacher.67
Comparatively, cyberbullying bystanders can be either more or less of a pres-
ence depending on how the cyberbully chooses to operate.68  It is possible that a 
bystander to a cyberbullying act could participate in the bullying, defend the vic-
tim, or choose to ignore it, just as with traditional bullying.69  Unlike traditional 
bullying, the bystander could unwittingly become part of the bullying, such as in a 
cyberbullying by proxy scenario, if the cyberbully utilizes the bystander’s screen 
name or email account to harass the victim.70  Troublingly, research also suggests 
networking websites, and are unfamiliar with the technologies that their children are using, making it more diffi-
cult to monitor their child’s online activities.  Id.
 59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text, describing how pivotal technology is in the lives of teens 
today.  See also Melissa McNamara, Teens Are Wired . . . And, Yes, It’s Okay, CBS NEWS, June 13, 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/09/gentech/main1698246.shtml (reporting that “[t]echnology is so 
integrated into teens’ lives that it’s difficult to measure where their offline life begins and their online life ends”).
 60. Wendland, supra note 56 (quoting Glenn Stutzky, a clinical professor at Michigan State University’s 
School of Social Work and school-violence specialist). 
 61. See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 78-79 (noting that “cyber bullying overall seems to occur more fre-
quently among girls than among boys”) (citation omitted). 
 62. Id. (describing survey results that showed more boys acknowledging that they cyberbullied someone at 
least once a week, and several times a week, than the girls surveyed who admitted to cyberbullying). 
 63. Id. at 80 (discussing the results of a scientific survey that authors conducted). 




 67. KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 63.  However, even the silence by these bystanders can be taken as passive 
support by the bully, or cause the victim to feel even more humiliated.  Id. at 63-64. 
 68. See WILLARD, supra note 1919, at 44 (suggesting that more research should be done on the role of 
bystanders in cyberbullying). 
 69. KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 64. 
 70. Id.
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that bystanders to cyberbullying are more likely to become cyberbullies themselves 
in the future, due to the lack of physical requirements associated with traditional 
bullies and anonymity offered by the internet.71  Thus, it is imperative that schools 
make preventing cyberbullying a priority.
Although cyberbullying attacks may sound insignificant to an outside observer, 
these acts can have permanent, serious effects on victims that cannot, and should 
not, be ignored.72  These effects are often more devastating than those experienced 
by victims of traditional bullying.73  In addition to feeling lonely, humiliated, and 
insecure, like victims of traditional bullying, cyberbullying victims also experience 
heightened feelings of anger, frustration, and depression.74  In some cases, these 
emotions can be so strong as to lead to suicidal ideations and even suicide at-
tempts.75 Victims also experience trouble concentrating, exhibit lower self-esteem, 
and demonstrate physical symptoms, such as headaches and abdominal discom-
fort.76  Furthermore, cyberbullying victims who know that the cyberbully is another 
student at school often fear and avoid attending school in an effort to evade face to 
face contact with the bully.77  Victims may be in constant fear for their safety at 
school and become preoccupied with both avoiding the perpetrator and ensuring 
that their surroundings are safe.78
All of these effects culminate in the victims’ inability to form positive relation-
ships with others and to function normally in their academic and familial responsi-
bilities.79   Stories shared by cyberbullying victims attest to the fact that cyberbully-
ing can decrease students’ grades and performance in school.80  Even when the 
 ________________________  
 71. Id.  Kowalski believes that all of these factors coupled together will make it easier for bystanders of 
cyberbullying to become desensitized to cyberbullying, and to become one themselves. Id.
 72. Wendland, supra note 56 (quoting Professor Glenn Stutzky as saying that “‘while these comments may 
seem silly to people who have matured, they are very devastating to the young people on the receiving end.’”).  
See also Hinduja & Patchin, infra note 77, at 2 (stating that the effects of cyberbullying are not limited to hurt 
feelings that can be easily disregarded and can permanently damage the psyche of many adolescents).
 73. See, e.g., Meadows, supra note 55; see also Wendland, supra note 56.  
 74. See Hinduja & Patchin, infra note 77, at 1-2; WILLARD, supra note 19 at 33-34 (listing the emotional 
problems experienced by cyberbullying victims). 
 75. See WILLARD, supra note 19, at 34.  Unfortunately, this is what happened to Jeff Johnston and Ryan 
Halligan when they could no longer stand being cyberbullied.  See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text. 
 76. See KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 85 (stating that the effects of cyberbullying are similar to traditional 
bullying, and can include “depression, low self-esteem, helplessness, social anxiety, reduced concentration,” and 
other negative emotions); see also WILLARD, supra note 19, at 34 (listing psychosomatic symptoms a cyberbully-
ing victim may experience). 
 77. See, e.g., Sameer Hinduja, Ph.D. & Justin W. Patchin, Ph.D., Cyberbullying Research Summary: Emo-
tional and Psychological Consequences (2008), available at 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_emotional_consequences.pdf.  Another report found that 400,000 
adolescents nationwide try to avoid attending school because they are being bullied, and approximately one out of 
three of those children are being cyberbullied.  Kathleen Carroll, Schools step up efforts to stop cyber bullying,
Jan. 4, 2009, available at http://www.northjersey.com/education/ bigpicture/37055169.html (quoting J. Frank 
Vespa-Papaleo, the director of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights).     
 78. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 77, at 2 (noting that victims are constantly surveilling the landscape 
of cyberspace or real space to guard against problematic personal encounters). 
 79. See id. (stating that a victim’s ability to focus on academics, family matters and responsibilities, and 
prosocial choices is compromised to some extent).  
 80. See, e.g., Meadows, supra note 55 (sharing several teen accounts of cyberbullying, and noting that 
more common than suicide, which one cyberbullying victim committed, cyberbullying “caused victims’ grades to 
plummet and kids to seek psychiatric help and change schools”);  see also Amanda Burgess-Proctor, Ph.D., et al., 
Cyberbullying Research Summary:  Victimization of Adolescent Girls 1, 1-2, available at
10
Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/3
Fall 2009 Using Tinker to Regulate Off-Campus Student Cyberbullying 113
cyberbullying acts occur off campus, in the privacy of the perpetrator and victim’s
respective homes, it can have long-lasting and destructive effects on the victim 
inside the school.81
In sum, cyberbullying is a growing problem in schools, just like traditional bul-
lying before the tragic Columbine shootings.  Because of its severe effects on stu-
dents, schools should be allowed to intervene in student cyberbullying cases and 
prevent further harm to victims of cyberbullying.  However, unlike incidents of 
traditional bullying, cyberbullying remains essentially unregulated in most states.82   
II. STUDENT FREE SPEECH ISSUES
Although a school may wish to intervene in cyberbullying incidents between 
students, its authority to do so under the First Amendment is currently unclear.  
While most states have adopted anti-bullying statutes, only a few of those clearly 
give schools jurisdiction to act in cyberbullying situations.83  Thus, the school must 
look to court decisions to ensure that it is not violating the free speech rights of 
cyberbullies by disciplining them.  This section details the current state of the law 
governing the free speech rights of students.   
A. Supreme Court Authority on Free Speech in the Schools 
Student rights to free speech in a public school are governed by a quartet of 
Supreme Court cases spanning the last four decades.  The first, Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, involved a group of students who 
were suspended for wearing black armbands to voice their opposition to the Viet-
nam War.84  The Supreme Court remarked on the need to balance the First 
Amendment rights of students with the ability of school administrators to make and 
enforce rules governing appropriate student conduct.85  Thus, it held that the school 
could quash student speech when it was materially or substantially disruptive, or 
when it violated the rights of other students.86  Since the armbands in Tinker were 
passive, and neither disrupted the classroom nor impinged on the rights of other 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_girls_victimization.pdf (22.7% of female victims in this study re-
ported feeling affected at school, even though the cyberbullying took place off- campus).  Depriving victims of 
their educational opportunities in this way is also one of the harms recognized in Title IX sexual harassment law-
suits.  See, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (noting that 
Title IX requires that “students must not be denied access to educational benefits and opportunities on the basis of 
gender”).
 81. See, e.g., Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 77, at 2 (describing the difficulties cyberbullying victims have 
in going to school after being cyberbullied). 
 82. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 83. Id.
 84. 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 85. Id. at 506-07 (stating that while “[i]t can hardly be argued that . . . students . . . shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” schools must be able “to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools” under the First Amendment).  
 86. Id. at 512-13 (citing Blackwell v. Issaquena Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussing past 
decisions in lower courts, and noting that student speech which “materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech”).  
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students, the Court ruled that the school violated the students’ right to free 
speech.87  Commentators suggest that Tinker is the most important case regarding 
student free speech rights, and that the later decisions are merely exceptions to the 
Tinker standard.88
The second case in the student speech quartet, Bethel School District Number 
403 v. Fraser, involved a high school student who described a fellow student’s 
candidacy for student body vice president using a series of sexual metaphors during 
a school assembly.89  The Court noted that Fraser’s speech was lewd and offensive, 
and upheld the school district’s suspension.90 In so ruling, the Court limited the 
scope of Tinker, and gave schools the authority to curtail student speech when its 
expression was lewd, offensive, and contrary to the school’s mission, even when 
not disruptive.91
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the third school speech case, further 
chipped away at Tinker.92  The school administration in that case deleted two ar-
ticles from the school newspaper concerning student pregnancy and the effect of 
divorce on students.93 Administrators were concerned that the topics were not ap-
propriate for younger students and that some of the anonymous students in the ar-
ticle could be identified.94  The Court reiterated that a school could curtail other-
wise un-censorable speech that conflicted with the school’s educational mission 
and values.95  This decision was partly because the student speech could be per-
ceived as “school-sponsored.”96  Thus, school-sponsored speech became another 
exception to Tinker.
The most recent case, Morse v. Frederick, further expanded the rights of school 
administration to curtail student speech.97  The school planned an event during the 
school day, allowing students to leave class to observe the Olympic torch passing 
 ________________________  
 87. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.The Court noted that the district court had found no evidence of disrup-
tion caused by the armbands, or that the armbands had interfered with the rights of other students at the school.  Id.
at 509.  It further observed that a school-issued memo on the suspension of the students had made no mention of 
any actual or potential disruption.  Id.
 88. See, e.g., Kellie A. Cairns, Morse v. Frederick:  Evaluating a Supreme Hit to Students’ First Amend-
ment Rights, 29 PACE L. REV. 151, 151 (2008) (stating that “the Court has steadily continued to carve out excep-
tions to [Tinker]”).
 89. Bethel Sch. Dist. Number 403 v. Fraser , 478 U.S. 675, 684-90 (1986).  Fraser depicted the other stu-
dent as “‘firm in his pants,’” and a person who goes to the “‘climax’” for his peers.  Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (citation omitted). 
 90. Id. at 683 (stating that the “pervasive sexual innuendo . . . was plainly offensive . . . to any mature 
person”). 
 91. Id. at 684-90. 
 92. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  
 93. Id. at 263. 
 94. Id.
 95. Id. at 260 (holding that “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic 
educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school”).
 96. Id. at 261 (maintaining that “[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
 97. 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2008); see also Cairns, supra note 88, at 151 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
made a mistake in carving an exception out of Tinker with Morse v. Frederick).  
12
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through the town.98  Frederick, a student at the school, did not show up for classes 
that morning, but came to see the torch pass.99  He stood off campus with class-
mates and held up a fourteen-foot wide, homemade banner with the phrase “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS.”100  When Frederick refused to take down his banner, the school 
principal suspended him.101  The Court rejected Frederick’s argument that the 
school could not punish his actions, as he had not been in attendance at school that 
day.102 However, the Court did note that there was no established boundary for 
when the school speech rules apply.103  It also found that the school principal did 
not violate Frederick’s First Amendment rights by prohibiting him from displaying 
the banner because it could reasonably be seen as promoting drug use, and the 
school could curtail such speech.104
All of the cases in the Supreme Court quartet reiterate the original standard set 
forth in Tinker:  schools are allowed to discipline students for speech that causes a 
substantial disruption in the classroom or interferes with the rights of other stu-
dents.105  However, the quartet leaves many questions unanswered, including 
whether off-campus student speech that reaches onto the school campus can be 
curtailed by school administrators.  This makes application of the Supreme Court 
precedent to cyberbullying cases difficult and unpredictable. 
B. Fleshing Out the Tinker Test 
Tinker gave the lower courts an adaptable test to use when analyzing student 
speech cases.  Since then, it has been largely up to the lower courts to flesh out the 
nuances of the Tinker test and to determine what constitutes substantial disruption 
and what speech impinges on the rights of others.106  This section discusses cases 
interpreting Tinker that are relevant to cyberbullying. 
1. Material and Substantial Disruption under Tinker
The first prong of the test laid out in Tinker allows schools to curtail student 
speech consistent with the First Amendment when the speech causes a substantial 
and material disruption inside the school.107  Since this prong has been well devel-
 ________________________  
 98. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.  The school arranged for students to be dismissed from class for a specified 




 102. Id. at 2624 (stating that Frederick could not “‘stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school 
hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not at school.’”) (citations omitted). 
 103. Id.  The Court asserted that while there “is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts 
should apply school-speech precedents . . . [it would not be] based on these facts.” Id.
 104. Id. at 2625.   
 105. See supra Part II.A.   
 106. The Tinker Court failed to define what behavior would constitute material and substantial disruption, 
and how large a portion of the classroom the speech would have to affect.  See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 
22, at 844.  The case also neglects to define what types of behavior would impinge on others’ rights, as well as 
what rights those students possessed in the first place.  Id. at 847.  See also supra Part II.A. 
 107. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969). 
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oped by courts interpreting it, school administrators can find a wealth of informa-
tion on which they can draw to determine if they can constitutionally prohibit cer-
tain student speech, including cyberbullying. 
Even before Tinker, several courts found that a school could prohibit student 
speech that caused an actual disruption inside the classroom.108  Both Burnside v. 
Byars and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education involved students 
wearing freedom buttons at school to show support for African American voting 
rights.109 Both lower courts that considered the matter rejected the students’ argu-
ments that the prohibition violated the students’ free speech rights.110  However, 
because the freedom buttons in Blackwell caused actual disruption in the school, 
the Fifth Circuit upheld the prohibition against wearing the freedom buttons in that 
case on appeal, where in Burnside it did not.111
However, neither Tinker nor the First Amendment requires schools to wait un-
til actual disruption occurs within the school.  Instead, administrators have a duty 
to prevent any such disruption from taking place.112 In order to constitutionally 
curtail speech by forecasting disruption, the Tinker Court examined whether the 
school could point to specific facts which made it reasonable to believe that ma-
terial and substantial disruption could occur on campus.113
Since then, other courts have expanded on what criteria schools can use to 
forecast material and substantial disruption.  Schools cannot, for instance, forecast 
material and substantial disruption due to students refusing to stand for the Pledge 
of Allegiance, but may base it on speech with sexual connotations.114  It is well 
established that schools can reasonably forecast disruption based on prior incidents 
outside the school.115  However, the prior events must have occurred relatively re-
cently in time.116
 ________________________  
 108. See Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1129 
(2009) (describing the Fifth Circuit cases Burnside and Blackwell which were decided just prior to Tinker, and 
cited in its opinion).  The Tinker Court cited these cases only in the final draft of its opinion, lending the ultimate 
test that it announced greater clarity than it had articulated in previous drafts.  Id. at 1160. 
 109. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 
F.2d 749, 750-52 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 110. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 744; Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 752. 
 111. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749; Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 753-54.   The court compared the two in its Black-
well opinion, noting that in Blackwell, the facts were much different than in Burnside which involved “no disrup-
tion of classes or school routine.”  363 F.2d at 753. 
 112. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.  See also Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that, 
under Tinker, school administrators “have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances” which could result 
from student speech). 
 113. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 114. See Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting school’s claim that they could 
forecast material and substantial disruption when a high school student refused to stand for the Pledge of Alle-
giance); Broussard ex rel. Lord  v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting that children are 
“easily distracted by language with sexual connotations”).   
 115. See, e.g., Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 1970) (school did not violate the First 
Amendment by prohibiting anti-war buttons because of a history of violence at the school regarding other but-
tons); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1972) (school could prohibit student from wearing a Con-
federate flag jacket to school because there was a tense, racial situation at the high school, and it could reasonably 
anticipate disruption based on past racial violence); Karp, 477 F.2d at 176 (school was justified in forecasting 
substantial and material disruption when a student organized a walkout during an awards presentation and invited 
the media); Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488 (D.S.C. 1997) (school could reasonably 
14
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Additionally, some courts hold that the school must be able to demonstrate a 
close nexus between those events and the speech in question.117  For instance, in 
Sypniewski v Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, the court found that the 
school could not use prior incidents involving a gang called the “Hicks” to forecast 
disruption from a Jeff Foxworthy “You Might Be A Redneck If . . .” T-shirt that a 
student wore to school.118  Similarly, in Chambers v. Babbitt, the court found that 
there was not a sufficient nexus between a prior racial incident and a student’s 
“Straight Pride” T-shirt by which the school could reasonably forecast disrup-
tion.119  
2. Impinging on the Rights of Other Students under Tinker 
The second prong of Tinker allows schools to curtail student speech when it 
impinges on the rights of other students.120  Particularly for incidents of cyberbully-
ing, this test could assist school administrators in showing that prohibition of the 
cyberbully’s speech was constitutional.121  Many court cases have expanded on the 
Tinker standard governing actual disruption and forecasting material and substan-
tial disruption.122  Curiously, though, very few courts have addressed the Tinker 
Court’s statement that a school can regulate speech that impinges on the rights of 
other students, leaving this standard regrettably ambiguous.123   
In Nixon v. Northern Local School Board of Education, the Southern District 
Court of Ohio grasped the opportunity to develop this test in ruling that a school 
  
forecast material and substantial disruption from a Confederate flag jacket based on racial tensions and prior 
disruptive incidents);  West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 2000) (school 
could reasonably forecast disruption when a student drew a Confederate flag on a paper in class because there was 
a history of racial violence at the school).   
 116. See Barber ex rel. Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 857 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding 
that a school could not reasonably forecast that a T-shirt stating George W. Bush was an “International Terrorist” 
would cause disruption based on events that occurred in response to Operation Desert Storm ten years earlier). 
 117. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that there 
needed to be some identifiable relationship linking the past disruption and the present speech in order for the 
school to be able to forecast disruption). 
 118. Id. at 274-75.  The court noted that a mere “association” between the prior events and the speech was 
not enough, because such a limited standard could lead to an almost unfettered authority to the school district to 
curtail student speech on a weakly premised connection.  Id. at 257.  Although the words “Hick” and “Redneck” 
had similar meanings, there was no evidence here that “Redneck” had ever been used to refer to the Hick gang 
before, or that the student’s shirt was intended to promote bigotry inside the school.  Id. 
 119. 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (D. Minn. 2001).  In the preceding school year, a series of racially-charged 
fights broke out in the school when a student wore a Confederate flag bandana.  Id. at 1070.  The court noted that 
the only factor in common between that incident and curtailment of the “Straight Pride” T-shirt was that the shirt 
and bandana were both articles of clothing.  Id. at 1072.  This, it held, was not a sufficient nexus to forecast vi-
olence based on sexual orientation from violence based on race.  Id. 
 120. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969). 
 121. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 122. See supra  Part II.B.1. 
 123. See, e.g., Andrew Canter & Gabriel Pardo, Comment, The Court’s Missed Opportunity in Harper v. 
Poway, 2008 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 125, 126 (2008) (stating that when the court denied certiorari to Harper v. 
Poway, it lost the chance to answer the question of whether it is “possible for a student’s words and writings alone 
to ‘invade the rights of others?’”).  See also Harvard Law Rev. Ass’n, Ninth Circuit Upholds Public School’s 
Prohibition of Anti-Gay T-Shirts, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1694 (2007) (noting that there is not universal recogni-
tion that this is a separate prong of the Tinker test, and most courts “treat the likelihood of ‘material disruption’ as 
dispositive when considering bans on political speech and symbols”). 
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could constitutionally prohibit a student from wearing a T-shirt reading “Homo-
sexuality is a sin!  Islam is a lie!  Abortion is murder!”124  The court expressly rec-
ognized that schools could, under Tinker, restrict student speech that interfered 
with the rights of other students.125  Noting the dearth of case law developing this 
test, the court interpreted Tinker to mean that students in the school maintain both 
the right to security and the freedom to be left alone.126  Since the court concluded 
that this T-shirt did not violate those rights, it held that the actions of the school 
were unconstitutional.127 
Another case addressing this prong of Tinker, however, found that a similar T-
shirt did impinge on the rights of other students.128  A student attended school 
wearing a shirt reading “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL.”129  In holding that 
the school could constitutionally prohibit the student from wearing the shirt, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that it relied solely on the provision of Tinker, which allows 
schools to prevent speech that interferes with the rights of others.130  The court ob-
served that this shirt collided with the rights of other students in the “most funda-
mental way,” which includes the right to be secure from both physical and psycho-
logical attacks.131  The court determined that speech against groups which have 
been “made to feel inferior[] serves to injure and intimidate them, as well as to . . . 
interfere with their opportunity to learn.”132  This case, however, is not controlling 
because the Supreme Court subsequently vacated it as moot.133 Additional courts 
have also recognized the right of students to feel psychologically secure under 
Tinker.134 
In sum, these cases, and others interpreting Tinker, give schools fairly wide la-
titude to curtail student speech under the First Amendment.135  Tinker has with-
stood many scenarios and interpretations, and has prevailed as a superior test ba-
 ________________________  
 124. 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2005).   
 125. Id. at 974 (“It is true that, according to Tinker, schools can regulate speech that invades on the rights of 
others.”).   However, the court noted that it could find no cases allowing the schools to curtail student speech based 
solely on this prong of Tinker.  Id. 
 126. Id.  (stating that “invading on the rights of other students entails invading on other students’ rights to be 
secure and to be let alone”).   
 127. Id.  
 128. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177-84 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 
U.S. 1262 (2007). 
 129. Id. at 1171.   
 130. Id. at 1175.  Lack of sole reliance on this prong of Tinker in other cases was pointed out in Nixon barely 
over a year prior.  See supra note 125.   
 131. Poway, 445 F.3d at 1178 (stating that “[b]eing secure involves not only freedom from physical assaults 
but from psychological attacks that cause young people to question their self-worth and their rightful place in 
society”). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).  Had the Supreme Court merely denied 
certiorari, the case could still be used as controlling case law.   
 134. For example, the Tenth Circuit held that, despite any evidence of potential physical violence, exhibiting 
the Confederate flag could reasonably be seen as interfering with the rights of students to be let alone.  West v. 
Darby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000).   The Ninth Circuit also previously held that 
vulgar terms may impinge on those same rights of students without any instance of physical attacks.  Chandler v. 
McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).   
 135. See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 22, at 865-66 (commenting that after Morse v. Frederick, 
school administrators have many ways in which they can constitutionally curtail student speech). 
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lancing both the free speech rights of students and the interest of the schools in 
educating and protecting their students.  It has also proven to be an adaptable test, 
and, if adopted by the courts, should provide schools additional guidance on how to 
analyze the murky and complicated scenario of the free-speech rights of student 
cyberbullies.136
III. THE CYBERBULLYING DILEMMA
A review of relevant case law uncovers little precedent on cyberbullying cases, 
and, indeed, cyberspeech cases in general.137  As with traditional bullying cases, 
this scarcity is likely due to most cases settling out of court, coupled with the fact 
that cyberbullying is only recently attracting the public’s attention.138  More troub-
lesome is that what little precedent exists regarding both off-campus student speech 
and cyberspeech is riddled with contradictions.139   This makes predicting how 
courts will treat cyberbullying, and thus advising clients, especially difficult.  Cy-
berbullying cases are further complicated by the fact that most cyberbullying acts 
occur off campus, arguably beyond the school’s authority.140  Even the lower courts 
have bemoaned the paucity of direction given to them in deciding off-campus stu-
dent speech cases.141  School officials are left uncertain as to which speech they can 
and cannot curtail without exposing themselves to liability, making them more 
likely to settle cases instead of litigate.142
Because of the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court on how to treat off-
campus student speech and cyberspeech, courts in different jurisdictions have ap-
plied inconsistent tests to the cases that have come before them.  These tests em-
ploy approaches ranging from holding that schools cannot curtail off-campus stu-
dent speech that arrives on campus, to utilizing a completely different constitution-
al approach under a “true threat” analysis, to applying several variations of Tinker.
This variety of approaches among the courts illustrates the need for a standardized, 
 ________________________  
 136. See infra Part III. 
 137. See, e.g., KOWALSKI, supra note 4, at 165 (noting that court decisions regarding cyberbullying are 
“scant”).
 138. Id. at 164-65. 
 139. See infra Part III.A-C. 
 140. See Tracy L. Adamovich, Return to Sender:  Off-Campus Student Speech Brought On-Campus By 
Another Student, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2008) (stating that the courts have given “little guidance” on 
this issue despite an “abundance of cases” regarding free speech rights of students with off-campus speech).  
Because of the increasing availability and accessibility of technology, it is likely that these cases will increase in 
frequency.  Id. at 1113.   
 141. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the various 
standards applied to off-campus student speech, and stating how commentators are “[f]rustrated by these inconsis-
tencies” and are “calling for courts to more clearly delineate the boundary line between off-campus speech entitled 
to greater First Amendment protection, and on-campus speech subject to greater regulation”).
 142. See, e.g., Kara D. Williams, Note, Public Schools vs. MySpace & Facebook: The Newest Challenge to 
Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 707, 730-31 (2008) (stating that “[s]chool officials have admitted to not 
knowing what students’ speech rights are,” especially when applying to social networking sites and other cybers-
peech) (citation omitted); see also Tresa Baldas, As ‘Cyber-Bullying’ Grows, and So Do Lawsuits, NAT’L L.J.. 
(Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1197281074941 (noting that school districts 
are fearful that if they curtail student cyberbullying they will be sued for violating student free speech rights, and if 
they do not stop that speech that they will be sued for failure to act). 
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adaptable test for courts to apply in cyberbullying cases, such as Tinker, that re-
flects the shrinking distinction between on- and off-campus speech due to today’s
technology.143  This section details the Circuit Courts’ split regarding the free-
speech rights of students in off-campus student speech and cyberspeech cases un-
der these varied approaches.   
A. Courts Holding Off-Campus Speech Cannot be Curtailed by the 
Schools 
Some scholars argue that off-campus student speech should not be subjected to 
analysis under Tinker, even if the speech is brought on campus by another student 
or a third party.144 Several courts have adopted this approach.  For instance, in 
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District the New York 
Supreme Court refused to apply Tinker to an offensive student newspaper article 
because it was written and distributed off campus, holding the article was beyond 
the reach of school administrators.145
In Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board, the Fifth Circuit also had to rule 
on off-campus student speech that was brought on campus by a third party.146   In 
reaching its decision, the court summarized a series of cases both following and 
refusing to apply Tinker in off-campus student speech cases.147  The court noted 
that the line between on-campus speech, subject to school curtailment, and off-
campus speech, receiving full constitutional protection, was unclear.148  However, 
it declined to apply Tinker to this set of facts, finding that the drawing in question 
was off-campus speech that only accidentally made its way on campus.149  A feder-
 ________________________  
 143. Some may argue that it does not matter whether students in different jurisdictions have different rights, 
and thus there is no need for a standardized test.  However, since free speech is a First Amendment right under the 
Constitution of the United States, students in all jurisdictions should have uniform rights regarding what speech is 
and is not allowed in school. 
 144. See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 22, at 882 (stating that students should not be accountable for 
off-campus speech which is brought on-campus by another student).   This reflects the analysis under the intent 
test.  See Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need for an Enhanced First Amendment 
Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 143-44 (2007) (arguing that 
courts should not be able to use a pure Tinker analysis to curtail off-campus student speech, and advocating the 
adoption of an intent test).  
 145. 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d. Cir. 1979) (holding that the “First Amendment will not abide the additional 
chill on protected expression that would inevitably emanate from” school administrator’s regulation of off-campus 
speech). 
 146. 393 F.3d at 608.  Fourteen-year-old Adam Porter drew a violent sketch at home of his high school 
exploding, accompanied by racial slurs and other offensive language.  Id. at 611.  Adam showed the drawing only 
to his mother and younger brother.  Id.  Two years later, Adam’s younger brother brought the picture to school and 
showed it to a bus driver.  Id.  School officials, alarmed over the graphic content of the drawing, suspended both 
Adam, for making the picture, and his younger brother, for possessing it on campus. Id. at 612. 
 147. Id. at 619-20. 
 148. Id. at 618 (“The line dividing fully protected ‘off-campus’ speech from less protected ‘on-campus’ 
speech is unclear, however, in cases such as this involving off-campus speech brought on-campus without the 
knowledge or permission of the speaker.”).
 149. Id. at 620 (holding that since the drawing was “composed off-campus, displayed only to members of 
his own household, stored off-campus, and not purposefully taken by him . . . or publicized in a way certain to 
result in its appearance at EAHS” the drawing was entitled to full constitutional protection). 
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al district court in Washington held similarly in a case analyzing a student’s web-
site in Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415.150   
These cases illustrate the very real possibility that a court may hold that 
schools cannot discipline student cyberbullies for speech that originates off cam-
pus.  The cases also demonstrate the current uncertainty as to the school’s jurisdic-
tion over off-campus student speech, and exemplify the need for courts to adopt 
clear standards to govern future cases. 
B.  Applying a True-Threat Analysis  
The Eighth Circuit, seemingly believing that off-campus speech should be cen-
sored by the schools but unsure under what standard, applied a different constitu-
tional approach in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District.151  The majority 
opinion omitted any discussion of Tinker, and analyzed the letters at issue, au-
thored by a student at home, under a “true threat” analysis.152 The “true threat” 
analysis looks at whether the speech in question involves a threat of violence such 
that it loses constitutional protection.153  The court ultimately found for the school 
because of the brutal nature of the letter, deciding that the letter constituted a true 
threat with no protection under the First Amendment.154  The dissenting opinion in 
Pulaski, however, pointed out that the majority failed to consider the effects stem-
ming from the speech arriving on a school campus.155
While the “true threat” analysis may be a possible tool in the school’s arsenal, 
it is unlikely to meet the needs of a school hoping to stop student cyberbullying, as 
most cyberbullying acts will not rise to this level of threat of violence.156  Indeed, 
most student speech in general would fail to satisfy the heightened threshold of a 
“true threat” analysis.  Perhaps that is why most courts, other than Pulaski, have 
failed to adopt this standard.  Instead, it would be better for the courts to adopt a 
 ________________________  
 150. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (noting, after explaining the Tinker standard, that 
“[a]lthough the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to Kentlake High School, the speech was entirely 
outside of the school’s supervision or control.”)
 151. 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).  J.M., an eighth grader, wrote two violent and terrorizing letters to K.G., 
a girl who had broken up with him at the start of the summer.  Id. at 619.  The letters expressed J.M.’s plans to 
molest, rape, and murder K.G.  Id.  Although J.M. willingly told K.G. about the existence of the letters over the 
phone, it was ultimately a third party who brought the letters on campus and gave them to K.G. to read. Id. at 619-
20.  Yet another student, who was present when K.G. read the letters, reported J.M. to school officials, who ex-
pelled him.  Id. at 620. 
 152. Id. at 622-27. 
 153. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706-07 (1969) (holding that a true threat fell outside the 
protections of the Constitution).  However, the Court did not define what constituted a true threat.  Pulaski, 306 
F.3d at 622. 
 154. Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 627. 
 155. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion “fail[ed] to consider the unique circums-
tances of speech in a school setting”).  Using a test involving both a “true threat” and Tinker analysis, the dissent 
concluded that the school did have jurisdiction to punish the student for writing the letters, even though he did so 
off campus.  Id. at 633-35.  However, he also opined that the school’s punishment was unduly harsh and should 
not be upheld.  Id.
156. See, e.g., Wendland, supra note 56.  Examples of cyberbullying acts include attacking someone’s
sexuality by calling victims gay or a lesbian, ridiculing their appearance or clothes, or spreading other rumors.  Id.
Professor Glenn Stutzky of Michigan State University notes that these often childish statements are devastating to 
victims because of their maturity level.  Id.
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more flexible test, such as Tinker, which gives schools a lower-threshold level on 
which they can act. 
C.  Courts Using a Tinker Analysis in Off-Campus Student Speech Cases 
Since Tinker is well established, many courts and scholars believe that both 
off-campus and student cyberspeech cases should be analyzed under Tinker.157  The 
first inkling that off-campus student speech is subject to the same standards as that 
occurring on-campus can be found in Tinker itself.  In the majority opinion, Justice 
Fortas states that out-of-class speech that causes substantial disruption in the class-
room, or impinges the rights of others, does not receive protection under the First 
Amendment.158 
The majority of courts ruling on whether schools can censor off-campus stu-
dent speech have applied some form of the Tinker analysis.159  In particular, Tinker 
has been used to analyze student newspapers created off campus160 and student 
websites.161  This seems consistent with the trend of giving escalating authority to 
schools to curtail student speech under the First Amendment across the Supreme 
Court student speech quartet.162   However, when the Supreme Court was presented 
with the recent opportunity in Morse v. Frederick to delineate the school’s jurisdic-
tion over off-campus speech (or lack thereof) and eliminate inconsistencies in the 
various tests used, it instead only further complicated the analysis.163   
Although student Joseph Frederick’s banner was displayed off campus, the 
Court both identified and quickly dismissed the issue of the boundaries of off-
campus student speech by simply stating that Frederick was at school.164  Frede-
rick, however, was not in attendance during morning classes that day and was 
 ________________________  
 157. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 142, at 724 (arguing that adopting a new test for cyberspeech would be 
problematic, overboard, and not applied by the courts); Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, 
and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WISC. L. REV. 1213, 1238 (2003) (noting that 
Tinker should apply to off-campus cyberspeech because of a lack of physical borders on the Internet). 
 158. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  Justice Fortas opined that: 
“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -- whether it stems from time, place, or type 
of behavior --. . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others 
is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” Id. (emphasis added).  Howev-
er, this statement, as used in the courts thus far, has been largely interpreted as referring to incidents on the play-
ground, school bus, or other places connected to the school.  Indeed, four of the states with electronic provisions in 
their anti-bullying statutes have limited it to a similar school setting.  See supra note 3. 
 159. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Many courts have applied the 
Tinker standard in evaluating off-campus student speech later brought on-campus by persons other than the speak-
er.”);  see also Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455  (W.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that it used 
Tinker because “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed student speech [whether on or off campus)] 
in accordance with Tinker.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 975 (5th Cir. 1972); Sullivan v. Houston 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (5th Cir. 1973).   
 161. See infra Part IV.B. 
 162. See, e.g., Adamovich, supra note 140, at 1090-95 (tracing the Supreme Court student speech decisions 
and commenting on the increasing power of the school board apparent in each decision).  
 163. See Roberts, supra note 16 at 1180 (noting that in allowing Principal Morse to discipline Frederick for 
his off-campus banner, the Court is laying “a framework for school officials to restrict more student speech than 
ever before,” especially cyberspeech). 
 164. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  In so deciding, the Court missed the opportunity to pro-
vide guidance on off-campus student speech to the lower courts which were hoping for it.  See supra note 141. 
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standing off of school property among both students and non-students.165  What 
could have potentially been ruled an off-campus speech case was brought within 
the jurisdiction of the school as on-campus speech, further eradicating the differ-
ence between on- and off-campus student speech.166
Similarly, students’ constant access to technology is also making it more diffi-
cult to judge which speech occurs on- and off-campus.167  Students using the Inter-
net as a forum for their speech are facing increasing difficulty keeping that speech 
off school grounds, even if they intend to do so.168 For instance, in J.S. v Bethlehem 
Area School District, this issue was especially apparent when the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that a school could not discipline a student for a webpage he 
created at home.169  Analyzing the student’s First Amendment claim under Tinker,
the court determined that because the student accessed the website at school, the 
website was on-campus speech, despite being developed in the student’s bed-
room.170  The problem of technological boundaries was similarly prevalent in Coy 
v. Board of Education of North Canton City Schools over another student’s web-
site.171  The federal district court in North Dakota reached the opposite result from 
J.S. over whether a website was on- or off-campus speech and ruled that the Tinker 
standard applied to the website despite the fact that it was off- campus speech.172
Another student webpage was the subject of analysis in Beussink v. Woodland R-IV 
 ________________________  
 165. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 
(2007).  The court acknowledges Frederick’s uncontradicted account that he had not attended school on that day, 
that he was across the street from the school campus, that the Olympic Torch relay was attended by many non-
students in the community as well as students from his high school, that schools were released from classes and 
did not have to attend, did not have to stay near a designated area of students or with their teachers (with the ex-
ception of one gym class), and that school officials made no attempt to keep students from leaving the area to go 
home.  Id.
 166. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 16, at 1178 (hypothesizing that Morse extends the schools’ jurisdiction 
off campus). 
 167. See supra Part III.B. 
 168. See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 22, at 868 (noting that “no one knows quite where the limits to 
the school’s authority lie” in off-campus cyberspeech cases). 
 169. 807 A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002).  J.S., a middle school student, created a series of linked web pages 
disparaging his teachers and principal.  Id.  In addition to offensive language, the website encouraged students to 
contribute money to hire a hitman to kill his algebra teacher.  Id.  The court first applied a true threat analysis, and 
determined that the website did not constitute a true threat.  Id. at 859-60 (noting that while in poor taste, the 
website did not indicate a real intention to inflict harm on the teacher).   
 170. Id. at 864-65 (“We hold that where speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel is 
brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be considered on-campus 
speech.”).  Because of the impact on the targeted teacher, and the fact that the website was a “hot topic” at school, 
the court held that the website materially and substantially disrupted the school, and the school’s expulsion was 
upheld.  Id. at 868-69.  The targeted teacher reported being afraid someone would actually kill her, and feeling 
anxious and stressed.  Id. at 852.  She suffered headaches, became depressed, lost sleep and weight, and exhibited 
memory problems.  Id.  These symptoms prevented her from both interacting socially with others and forced her to 
take a medical leave of absence from school.  Id.   
 171. 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 795 (N.D. Ohio 2002).  A student created a website at home, containing pictures 
of three classmates and a series of insults under a section labeled “Losers.”  Id.  The court observed that while 
objectionable, none of the material on the website could be considered obscene under Fraser. Id.
 172. Id. at 799-800.  It then noted that the defendants could point to no evidence that the website created 
disruption within the school, and thus denied the school’s motion for summary judgment.  Id.
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School District.173  A federal district court in Missouri again analyzed the case un-
der Tinker’s material and substantial disruption standard.174
In sum, courts have widely accepted the Tinker disruption test for on-campus 
student speech and used to analyze many instances of off-campus student speech.  
Thus, it is definitely one of the tests a court will consider adopting for instances of 
off-campus cyberbullying.   
D. Courts Applying a Hybrid Approach to Tinker for Off-Campus Student 
Speech  
Even in applying the Tinker test, many courts and scholars suggest the need for 
something besides material and substantial disruption, or an infringement on other 
students’ rights in off-campus speech cases.175   Particularly, one line of precedent 
examines whether there is a sufficient nexus between the speech and the forecast of 
disruption such that the school can constitutionally curtail the speech.  A comple-
mentary set of cases considers the intent of the speaker, asking whether it was rea-
sonably foreseeable that the speech would end up on campus.   
1.  Finding a Nexus Before Applying Tinker
The first of these hybrid approaches searches for a nexus between the off-
campus student speech and the forecast of disruption, just as in Sypniewski and 
Chambers.176  This test was utilized by the court in Layshock v. Hermitage School 
District.177  The federal district court in Pennsylvania looked for a nexus between a 
mock MySpace page created by the student and the forecasted disruption before it 
applied the Tinker standard.178  Another MySpace page was analyzed by a different 
federal district court in Pennsylvania in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School 
District.179  Reflecting on the enormous role technology is playing in students’
lives, which is causing student speech to arrive on campus with increasing frequen-
cy, the court concluded that schools have the right to censor off-campus student 
 ________________________  
 173. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  A high school junior created a homepage containing 
vulgar language about his school, teachers, and administrators.  Id.
 174. Id. at 1180.  Because the website had only been accessed by one student at school, and because Bran-
don did not share the website with any students except for that one, the court held the Tinker’s material and sub-
stantial disruption standard was not satisfied.  Id.  In fact, the only reason that the other student accessed the web-
site at school was to show it to a teacher to get back at the defendant after they got in a fight.  Id. at 1177-78. 
 175. See infra Part III.D.1-2. See also Markey, supra note 144, at 143-44 (advocating an intent test)  
 176. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 177. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Pa. 2007).  A student created a mock MySpace page for his school’s
principal, filling in “silly” and “crude juvenile language” for answers to questions on the profile.  Id.
 178. Id. at 595-96.  Since it found that no such nexus between the speech and alleged disruption existed, 
especially considering the presence of several other MySpace profiles mocking the principal, the court found the 
school’s discipline unconstitutional.  Id. at 600-01. 
 179. No. 3:07cv585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).  Like in Layshock,
this MySpace page also scorned the student’s principal.  Id.  This page, however, repeatedly referred to the prin-
cipal as a pedophile and a sex addict.  Id. at *1. 
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speech under Tinker.180  However, it believed that a satisfactory nexus must exist 
between the off-campus speech and the Tinker factors before the school could pu-
nish the student for his or her speech.181   
2.  Conducting an Intent-Based Analysis 
Many scholars suggest that the intent of the student speaker should be an im-
portant consideration in the analysis of whether a school has the authority to discip-
line students for their off-campus speech.182  The Second Circuit adopted this rea-
soning in several cases. 
In Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School District, the 
Second Circuit overturned its previous precedent in Thomas, holding that, under 
Tinker, schools could censor off-campus student speech that arrived on campus.183
The court, however, struggled over whether the intent of the student speaker should 
be important in determining whether the school could curtail the speech.184  The 
Second Circuit then had the opportunity to revisit this question in 2008, when it 
decided Doninger v. Niehoff.185  The court began its analysis by recognizing that 
technology is clouding the lines between on- and off-campus speech, and then 
stated that Tinker was the appropriate standard to apply in both circumstances.186
However, it then definitively stated that schools could censor off-campus student 
 ________________________  
 180. Id. at *7 n.5 (stating that technology has blurred the line between on- and off-campus student speech, 
and that since “technology allows such access, it requires school administrators to be more concerned about speech 
created off campus-which almost inevitably leaks onto campus ! than they would have been in years past.”).
 181. Id. at *7.  Here, the court found a satisfactory nexus between the MySpace page and the school, noting 
that the student used the principal’s photograph from the school website, and created the page for the entertain-
ment of other students at the school.  Id. at *6-7.  Then, despite finding that there was no material or substantial 
disruption under Tinker, the court found that the school could still censor the student’s speech due to the serious 
language that the student used, which, in this instance, could warrant criminal charges.  Id.
 182. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 16, at 1183-85 (suggesting that the intent of the student should be an 
important factor in any analysis of off-campus speech, as otherwise you are giving too much deference to the 
school board and other students); Markey, supra note 144, at 143-44 (advocating for the intent test); Dickerson, 
supra note 17, at 28-29 (discussing why the intent test is the best test for cyberbullying analyses).  
 183. 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007).  See also supra Part III.A.  In Wisniewski, a school suspended a student 
upon discovering a Buddy Icon he created on AOL’s Instant Messaging program depicting a person being shot, 
and the text “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” the student’s English teacher. 494 F.3d at 36.   A Buddy Icon is a small 
picture each AOL Instant Messaging user selects to be displayed on every conversation window that the user has 
with other users.  
 184. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 (noting its conflicting views over whether it must be “reasonably foreseea-
ble that Aaron’s IM icon would reach the school property or whether the undisputed fact that it did reach the 
school pretermits any inquiry as to this aspect of reasonable forseeability”).  Here, however, the court found this 
discussion was irrelevant, since it was reasonably foreseeable to the student that the Buddy Icon would make its 
way in to the school. Id. at 39-40.  This gave school administrators authority to discipline the student for his off-
campus speech consistent with Tinker. Id.
 185. 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008).  A disgruntled student wrote a blog entry referring to school adminis-
trators as “douchebags.”  Id.  The blog also contained misinformation claiming the principal had cancelled a 
school event, and urged students to call or email the principal to “piss her off more.”  Id.   
 186. Id. at 48-49 (stating that the school’s ability to censor off-campus speech is more appropriate today 
“when students both on and off campus routinely participate in school affairs, as well as in other expressive activi-
ty unrelated to the school community, via blog postings, instant messaging, and other forms of electronic commu-
nication”).
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speech only “when it was . . . foreseeable that the off-campus expression might 
also reach campus.”187
Thus, the Second Circuit embraced the intent test for dealing with off-campus 
student speech.  It is likely that the intent analysis will be one of the tests consi-
dered by a court deciding whether a school has the authority to stop cyberbullying, 
since it gives additional emphasis to the constitutional rights of students while off 
campus. 
Because of the inconsistent application of standards to cases involving off-
campus student speech that arrives on campus, the school’s authority to discipline 
cyberbullies over such speech is unclear.  As such, current law is inadequate to 
protect victims of cyberbullying from its devastating effects.188  The courts must 
adopt a standardized test that gives schools the authority to discipline student cy-
berbullies and provides schools with a clear idea of when they can and cannot con-
stitutionally intervene in cyberbullying incidents. 
IV. TINKER SHOULD GOVERN OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT CYBERBULLYING
The cases above illustrate several ways in which courts can give schools the 
authority to punish cyberbullies for their speech.  First, as in Doe v. Pulaski, the 
court can find that the student’s speech constitutes a “true threat” and lacks protec-
tion under the First Amendment.189  Second, if the speech is school-sponsored, 
such as a blog for a class, the courts can apply the analysis in Hazelwood and allow 
the schools to curtail it consistent with the pedagogical values they are supposed to 
instill.190  If the cyberbully uses a school-issued computer or school Internet, ad-
ministrators could use the analysis under Frederick or Hazelwood to stop the 
speech.191  However, it is the most common type of cyberbullying, occurring off 
campus through personal computers, where the school’s jurisdiction is currently 
uncertain. 
This section will first discuss why the definition of cyberbullying needs to be 
established, given the lack of consensus in the definition, as addressed earlier.192
Specifically, it will argue why cyberbullying should be confined to incidents occur-
ring between two minor children.  This section will then analyze why Tinker is a 
superior test, and why the courts should adopt Tinker for determining whether a 
school’s curtailment of off campus cyberbullying is constitutional.  Finally, this 
section will describe how a school can use Tinker to intervene in cyberbullying 
situations. 
 ________________________  
 187. Id. at 48 (citing Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40).  The court looked at the student’s intent, saying that she 
created the blog to reach campus, and thus found the school could censor her speech.  Id.  However, this leaves 
open the question of whether recklessness in making the speech would satisfy this requirement. 
 188. See supra Part III.A-D; see also supra Part I.B.     
 189. See supra Part III.C. 
 190. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 261; see also supra Part II.A. 
 191. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 261; Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2008); see also supra Part 
II.A. 
 192. See supra Part I.A. 
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A.  Cyberbullying Should Only Be Used to Describe Incidents Between 
Two Minors 
As noted previously, many legal scholars refer to incidents involving a student 
and adult faculty members, such as that presented in J.S. or Layshock, as cyberbul-
lying.193  However, this is inconsistent with the current understanding of traditional 
bullying and will lead to the formation of a test that is ill-adapted to protect student 
cyberbullying victims.   
from the school may be enough to curb the cyberbully’s behavior.194 Tradition-
al bullying is used to describe incidents occurring between school-age children.195
The law has developed other terms, such as harassment, abuse, or assault, to de-
scribe acts occurring between two adults, or an adult and child.196  Following that 
trend, especially given the similarities between cyberbullying and traditional bully-
ing, it is logical to limit the definition of cyberbullying to the acts of school-age 
children.  Victims of incidents involving a child and adult, or two adults, have oth-
er legal claims available to proceed under, including defamation, cyberharassment, 
and cyberstalking.197  These offenses, often more serious than the acts of a cyber-
bully, can be more appropriately prosecuted in the criminal system or litigated in 
civil courts.198  Comparatively, it would be a waste to utilize court resources in a 
cyberbullying claim when schools are in a better position to educate the cyberbully 
as to appropriate online and social behavior, as well as to determine and oversee 
 ________________________  
 193. See supra Part III.B; see also supra notes 22 and 23 demonstrating the current manner cyberbullying is 
being used to describe actions beyond those involving a minor perpetrator and minor victim.   
 194. This is especially true given the phenomenon of disinhibition on the Internet, where a cyberbully may 
not realize the extent of suffering the victim is experiencing because of his or her actions.  See supra Part I.B; see 
also Stayton, supra note 42 (describing the remorse felt by a student cyberbully once he was aware of the effects 
of his actions on his victim). 
 195. See, e.g., supra note 23.  All state bullying laws regulate incidents between two school children.   
 196. See generally Black’s Law Dictionary 315 (2d. pocket ed. 2001) (defining harassment as “[w]ords, 
conduct, or action (usu. repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes 
substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no legitimate purpose”); id. at 4 (defining abuse as 
“[p]hyiscal or mental maltreatment, often resulting in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury”); id. at 45 
(defining assault as “[t]he threat or use of force on another that causes that person to have a reasonable apprehen-
sion of imminent harmful or offensive contact”).  
 197. See, e.g., Sajai Singh, Anti-Social Networking: Learning the Art of Making Enemies in Web 2.0, 12 No. 
6 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2008) (describing cyber-harassment, and cyber-stalking).  Indeed, this was pointed out in a 
recent incident deemed “cyberbullying” by many, when two female students at Yale Law School became victims 
of a series of vicious posts on an online bulletin board, commenting on their integrity and sexual promiscuity.  See
Cyber Harassment and the Law (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.onpointradio.org/2009/03/cyber-harassment.  One victim claimed that the posts online harmed her 
reputation and ability to secure employment.  Id.  The show points out that this sort of behavior is much too se-
rious to be termed “cyberbullying.” It is a more serious defamation or cyber-harassment action.  Id.
 198. This, for instance, was the fate of Lori Drew, the forty-year-old woman who used MySpace to harass 
thirteen- year old Megan Meier.  See, supra note 23, and accompanying text. 
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appropriate punishment.199  Oftentimes, this decorum lesson from the school may 
be enough to curb the cyberbully’s behavior.200
Giving a concrete age definition to cyberbullying also allows for the formula-
tion of a better test reflecting the differences in maturity between children and 
adults.  Child victims may fear going to school, experience physical symptoms, 
have low self-esteem, and exhibit decreased performance in school.201  Adult vic-
tims of cyber-crimes are more likely to brush it off, making it unlikely that they 
will experience the same effects or, if they do, at the same degree of severity as a 
child victim.202   
This limitation will also allow for the courts to develop a clearer, narrower test 
for dealing with instances of cyberbullying consistent with other student speech 
cases.  Further, it will give added protection to the free-speech rights of the student 
cyberbullies themselves, taking into consideration the maturity level and ages of 
their targeted victims.  Such a definition would allow punishment of the cyberbully 
for comments which, although seemingly silly, are hurtful and damaging to child 
victims.  However, if a student targets an adult victim, he or she would be allowed 
a greater range of speech before it could be constitutionally censored.  This reflects 
the different maturity levels of the student and adult involved. 
Therefore, “cyberbullying” should be defined with an age limitation, restricting 
it to behavior between two minors.  Any incidents involving two adults, or an adult 
and a minor, should be more properly categorized as cyber-harassment, cyber-
stalking, or more general cyberspeech.   
B. Courts Should Employ Tinker to Analyze Whether Schools can Regu-
late Off-Campus Cyberbullying 
The Supreme Court student speech quartet leaves many unanswered questions, 
notably the authority of the school administrators over off-campus student 
speech.203  Already, issues regarding off-campus speech and technological bounda-
ries have divided courts.204  Indeed, the federal district court in Pennsylvania and 
 ________________________  
 199. Teachers and school administrators, more so than children’s parents, can see the interactions between 
students and are more likely to either observe or hear about incidents of cyberbullying.  The importance in school 
oversight has been recognized in statutes allowing schools to intervene in instances of traditional bullying.  See,
supra note 24, and accompanying text. 
 200. This is especially true given the phenomenon of disinhibition on the Internet, where a cyberbully may 
not realize the extent of suffering the victim is experiencing because of his or her actions.  See supra Part I.B; see 
also Stayton, supra note 42 (describing the remorse felt by a student cyberbully once he was aware of the effects 
of his actions on his victim). 
 201. See supra Part I.B (explaining the effects of cyberbullying on victims). 
 202. Cf.  FATIMA GOSS GRAVES, RESTORING EFFECTIVE PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS AGAINST SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS: MOVING BEYOND THE GEBSER AND DAVIS STANDARDS 2 (2008), http://www. ac-
slaw.org/files/Goss%20Graves%20--%20%20Moving%20Beyond%20Gebser%20and%20Davis%20Final.pdf 
(stating that student victims of sexual harassment are more likely to suffer serious harms than adult victims, and 
are more likely to silently tolerate harassment that adults would not).  See also Wendland, supra note 56 (quoting 
school violence expert Glenn Stutzky describing how cyberbullying acts that are devastating to student victims 
often seem silly and immature to adults). 
 203. See supra Part II.A. 
 204. See supra Part III. 
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the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in deciding Layshock and J.S., reached oppo-
site conclusions over whether silently accessing a website at school constituted on-
campus speech.205  Courts in Thomas and Porter ruled that schools could not curtail 
off-campus speech under any circumstances, while other courts have ruled that 
schools can, provided the speech meets a variety of differing tests.206 
The lower court decisions illustrate the main problem persisting after the Su-
preme Court decisions:  the law governing student speech has not caught up with 
technology.  Neither the courts, nor the anti-bullying laws of most states, provide 
assurance to school administrators that they have the authority to punish student-
on-student cyberbullying.207  The decisions in the courts are inconsistent, and leave 
schools more confused than ever as to when they can constitutionally intervene in 
acts of cyberbullying.208  We should not wait for another Columbine-like tragedy 
before we recognize the seriousness of the cyberbullying problem and take steps to 
prevent it from occurring.  However, until states enact laws suitable to deter cyber-
bullying and protect victims, schools should be given leeway to investigate cyber-
bullying incidents among their students and to punish student cyberbullies. 
The ability of school administrators to curtail student speech occurring off-
campus can be extracted from the Supreme Court decisions.  In Tinker, the Court 
concerned itself with balancing the rights of students to voice unpopular political 
opinions with the rights of schools to maintain discipline and the rights other stu-
dents to feel safe.209  In Fraser, the Supreme Court granted even more deference to 
school administrators to provide students with a safe school environment.  Subse-
quently in Hazelwood and, even more clearly in Morse, the Court further expanded 
the authority of the schools to curtail student speech.210  This trend suggests that the 
schools, and not the judicial system, are more aptly suited to determine what stu-
dent speech is inappropriate, and to prohibit that speech under the First Amend-
ment.   
The school is in the unique position to both identify student cyberbullies and 
educate them as to proper behavior.  This is, after all, consistent with schools’ pe-
dagogical mission, as the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in Hazelwood.211  
Since cyberbullying, in both form and effect, is so similar to traditional bullying, 
where the school’s authority is clearer, it seems logical that schools are the proper 
party to curtail student cyberbullying as well.212  Thus, schools should have the 
authority to constitutionally discipline students for acts of cyberbullying, even 
when occurring off campus. 
 ________________________  
 205. In J.S. the court held that merely accessing the website at the school made it on-campus speech, in 
Layshock the court found it did not.  See supra Parts III.B and III.D. 
 206. See supra Part III.  The same circuit that decided Thomas later held that a website created off-campus 
in Wisniewski could be curtailed under Tinker.  See id. 
 207. See supra note 24; see also supra Part III. 
 208. See supra Part III.  
 209. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra Part II.A. 
 211. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 261(maintaining that “[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities 
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”). 
 212. See supra Part I.B. 
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1.  A Clear Test for Cyberbullying Cases is Needed 
While support for school authority to curtail and discipline students for inci-
dents of cyberbullying can be found amongst commentators, many frequently state 
that such punishment decisions can and should be left to the school’s discretion.213
However, without the adoption of a more concrete standard for administrators to 
follow, this is an unacceptable position.  First, it fails to properly balance students’
free speech rights as identified in Tinker.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, it 
does nothing to eliminate the current uncertainty over when a school can and can-
not intervene in acts of student cyberbullying without violating the First Amend-
ment. 
Further, without the delineation of a useful test, school administrators will be 
uncomfortable curtailing student speech for fear of lawsuits.214  Especially given 
the current uncertainty over the off-campus free speech rights of students and the 
muddled handling of student cyberspeech cases by the lower courts, it is in the best 
interests of teachers, students, and courts if a clear test is set forth.  Ideally, such a 
test will give schools guidance as to when they can and cannot discipline students 
for off-campus cyberbullying.215   
Some advocate for the formulation of an entirely new test by the courts to deal 
with cyberbullying, citing the problems created by technological student speech, 
notably its common occurrence off campus.216  However, implementation of a new 
standard unique to cyberbullying would bog down school administrators and cause 
additional burdens on courts forced to interpret its provisions.  Instead, the Tinker
test, which is already widely accepted and utilized by courts and educators alike, is 
the best test for courts to apply in cyberbullying cases.217  Indeed, many courts have 
already adopted and applied Tinker in a variety of cyberspeech cases.218  Given 
Tinker’s acceptance and ease of application, there is no need for development of a 
separate test for a small subset of student speech cases. 
Because of the balancing test in Tinker, it can adequately protect the rights of 
student speakers and schools, even given the additional complications associated 
with cyberbullying cases such as the off-campus nature of many cyberbullying 
attacks.219  For instance, acts of off-campus cyberbullying that fail to meet the ma-
terial and substantial disruption test cannot be punished by the school, thus protect-
ing the free speech rights of the student cyberbully.  However, the school can inter-
 ________________________  
 213. See, e.g., Erb, supra note 22, at 282 (arguing that it is “practical” to leave this decision to the school); 
see also Servance, supra note 157, at 1243 (stating that the “courts should defer to schools”).
 214. See Baldas, supra note 142 (noting that teachers are currently afraid to curtail student speech for fear of 
lawsuits).  Although some schools and teachers may not settle because of the protection of qualified immunity, the 
expense and time of involvement of the lawsuit will serve as an effective deterrent for curtailing student speech in 
many instances. 
 215. See supra Part II-III; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Williams, supra note 142 (stating that courts would not likely apply a new test).  At least one court 
has already declined to adopt a higher standard than Tinker for off-campus speech.  Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. 
Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
 217. See supra Part III.C-D. 
 218. See supra Part III.C. 
 219. See supra Part III. 
28
Barry Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol13/iss1/3
Fall 2009 Using Tinker to Regulate Off-Campus Student Cyberbullying 131
vene in incidents that do satisfy the Tinker test, allowing the school to fulfill its 
obligation to protect its students.  Additionally, adoption of the Tinker test also 
adequately reflects the age limitation proposed in this Article to the definition of 
cyberbullying.220  Since schools applying the Tinker standard generally lack author-
ity over adults, limiting cyberbullying to acts between minors allows Tinker to be 
used in all cyberbullying situations instead of formulating separate tests.   
Further, adoption of Tinker in cyberbullying cases provides educators with a 
wealth of information from scholars and courts alike, which they can utilize to 
make their decisions regarding punishing student cyberbullies.221 Specifically, the 
line of precedent regarding forecasting material and substantial disruption within 
the school has been fleshed-out extensively by the lower courts.222  This will give 
the schools ample guidance on when they can intervene under Tinker, even when 
the cyberbullying occurs off-campus.  This information gives schools freedom to 
discipline student cyberbullies consistently with prior cases without fearing student 
lawsuits.223  Further, the prong of Tinker allowing schools to curtail student speech 
that infringes on the rights of others seems especially suited to cyberbullying cases.  
Although sparsely litigated, the psychological harm and fearfulness for safety ex-
perienced by cyberbullying victims seems to be the exact type of harm identified in 
the few cases to address the prong.224  Thus, cyberbullying cases are the perfect 
student speech cases for the widespread acceptance of this prong of Tinker, further 
supporting the adoption of Tinker in cyberbullying cases.225   
Tinker is already familiar to both the schools and the courts, and will provide 
the workable test that is desperately needed.  Indeed, Tinker has been widely uti-
lized even in cases involving cyberspeech and off-campus student speech, which 
are uncertain areas that complicate the cyberbullying analysis.226  Thus, Tinker is 
the best test the courts can adopt to govern student cyberbullying decisions. 
2.   Tinker Should Be Used for Both On- and Off-Campus Cyberbullying
The unique and controversial legal aspects surrounding cyberbullying, namely 
the use of technology and the off-campus nature of the speech, are also easily 
adaptable to the Tinker test.  While the courts are certainly not unanimous in their 
decisions, quite a few courts have already adopted Tinker analysis in off-campus 
student speech and cyberspeech cases.227  The latest Supreme Court decision in 
Morse also explicitly recognizes that the line between on- and off-campus speech is 
becoming increasingly unclear.228   
 ________________________  
 220. See supra Part IV.1.  
 221. See supra Part II.B. 
 222. See supra II.B. 
 223. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 225. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 226. See supra Part III. 
 227. See id.
 228. See supra Part III.B; see also supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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By deciding Morse as an on-campus speech case, despite Frederick’s physical 
presence off campus, the Court further added to the confusion between which 
speech is on-campus, and which speech is not.229  It seemingly expands the juris-
diction of schools over speech that occurs outside of the confines of the school 
grounds, consistent with what was perhaps the original intent of Tinker.
With today’s tech-savvy students and the constant accessibility of cell phones 
and the Internet, the distinction between on- and off-campus speech only continues 
to blur, making this a very different world indeed than that in which Thomas was 
litigated thirty years ago.230  When Frederick displayed his banner, he knew that it 
would be seen by other students and adults, all standing off of, albeit around, 
school property.  A cyberbully, however, has no way of knowing where or when 
his or her victim will be when the hurtful act is viewed.  The constant accessibility 
of victims to the cyberbully, given the availability of technology, means the cyber-
bully has no real way of predicting whether the victim will receive the taunts while 
at home, at school, or somewhere else.  This makes it increasingly difficult for 
courts already puzzled over whether accessing a website on school grounds is on-
campus speech to decipher whether cyberbullying is more akin to on- or off-
campus speech.  Like Frederick’s banner, it is hard to determine whether these acts 
occur on- or off-campus.  This is especially true considering teachers and adminis-
trators are often less adept with today’s technologies than their students and may be 
unable to determine whether the student cyberspeech was actually sent or accessed 
on campus.231
Further, unlike the websites in Beussnik and Snyder, which may have inspired 
laughs from classmates, cyberbullying victims carry the off-campus speech back 
with them into the school.  Besides constantly fearing that they will run into their 
tormentor, their academic performance in school is reduced.232  Thus, even if the 
cyberbully knows his or her victim will view the acts while at home, victims are 
still bringing effects with them back into the school, where the acts may be ampli-
fied by the physical presence of the cyberbully.233
These same arguments also illustrate why using an intent test, such as that pro-
posed by the Second Circuit in Wisniewski and Niehoff, is illogical for cyberbully-
ing given today’s technology.234 Regardless of the cyberbully’s intent, because the 
cyberbully does not know the physical location of his or her victim may be either at 
 ________________________  
 229. In addition, while the Court noted a distinction between on-and off-campus speech, it gave no hints as 
to whether the categorization of the speech made a difference as to which analysis applied. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. 
at 2618.  
 230. The court in Snyder acknowledged as much in its analysis.  Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 
3:07cv585, slip op. at 7 n.19 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008). 
 231. See, e.g., Growing Up Online, supra note 4 (interviewing a teacher who admits to feeling like a “dino-
saur” because her students know how to use technology in ways she does not).   
 232. See supra Part I.B. 
 233. See id. (describing the effects of cyberbullying on victims).  Particularly, cyberbullying victims are 
constantly on edge during the school day, trying to locate and avoid their cyberbully, leading to a greater decline in 
academic performance.  Id.
 234. See supra Part III.D.2 for a discussion of the intent test. 
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home or at school when he or she views the cyberbullying act.235  Further, while 
the cyberbully may not intend it, victims bring the effects of the cyberbullying into 
the school with them.236  The cyberbully should not be able to escape punishment 
by claiming that he did not intend the victim feel afraid of him, or intend the vic-
tim’s grades to suffer.  Instead, the cyberbully should have to be responsible for the 
consequences of his or her actions.237
Although an intent test approach has been championed in legal scholarship, it 
has not been adopted by other courts.238  This can, perhaps, also be partially ex-
plained by the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse.  Frederick’s speech occurred 
off campus, among students and non-students, on a day Frederick had not been in 
attendance at school.239  By allowing the school to curtail Frederick’s speech, the 
Court insinuates that the intent of the student is not an essential consideration of 
which speech the school can censor. 
Due to the increasingly hazy line between on- and off-campus student cyber-
bullying, the distinction in location should not matter for purposes of any test or 
analysis.  So long as the school can show that, pursuant to Tinker, the cyberbully-
ing caused a material and substantial disruption inside the school or infringed on 
the rights of another student, the school should be able to punish the cyberbully 
regardless of the physical location where it occurred.  Thus, Tinker is the best test 
the courts can adopt to protect student cyberbullying victims, while balancing the 
free speech rights of cyberbullies. 
C.  Using the Tinker Test in Off-Campus Cyberbullying 
If courts adopt a Tinker analysis to determine whether schools can discipline 
students for off-campus cyberbullying, the school still needs to satisfy one of the 
prongs to avoid violating the free speech rights of the cyberbully.  Under both 
prongs of the Tinker test, provided the victims experience the requisite effects, the 
school will be able to regulate and punish student cyberbullies.  This section will 
provide guidance as to how schools can proceed under each prong of Tinker.
 ________________________  
 235. Thus, even if the court system did widely adopt the intent test, it is likely that cyberbullying would 
meet that test.  Because the perpetrator committed the cyberbullying acts via technology, it was reasonably fore-
seeable that the acts would reach campus.  It is similarly foreseeable that the cyberbullying victim will carry the 
effects of the cyberbullying acts into the school.  The court’s interpretation, though, seems to be less stringent than 
that advocated by legal scholars.  See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 16, at 1183-85.   
 236. See supra Part I.B. 
 237. This position finds additional support when examining tort and criminal law, on the basis that the 
perpetrator takes his victim as he finds them, known as the eggshell skull doctrine.  This doctrine was first enun-
ciated in the English case Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669, 679, and has since been fairly universally 
accepted in the United States.  JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 11:1 (1998). Thus, if a 
cyberbully chooses a victim who takes the effects of cyberbullying with him into the school, the cyberbully should 
be responsible for that even if another victim would find the acts less harmful.  Criminal law standards further lend 
themselves to this position, in that recklessness is often a substitute for willfulness or intent. 
 238. See supra Part III.D.2. 
 239. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2008). 
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1. School Officials Can Forecast a Material and Substantial Disruption from 
Off-Campus Cyberbullying  
Under Tinker, the school can curtail student cyberbullying if it causes actual 
disruption within the school.  For instance, as in Blackwell, if the cyberbully physi-
cally bullies the victim during school, or if people are using classroom time to dis-
cuss the cyberbullying instead of doing schoolwork, the school will be able to step 
in and curtail the cyberbullying.240
But of course schools are not required to wait for actual disruption according to 
Tinker.    This is especially important in our post-Columbine world.  Waiting for 
the actual disruption to occur may have catastrophic detrimental effects for the 
cyberbullying victim.241  Thus, it is in the best interests of the school to forecast 
reasonable disruption and curtail student cyberbullying as quickly as possible.  
Layshock and Snyder seem to spin the test created in Chambers and Sypniews-
ki, looking for a nexus between the off-campus speech and the forecasted disrup-
tion and the off-campus speech and the school.242  With cyberbullying, showing 
this nexus should be easy for the school.  The off-campus cyberbullying can be 
reasonably forecasted to cause substantial disruption within the school if the victim 
demonstrates effects such as insecurity at the school, fearfulness, or depression.243
Since empirical evidence shows that this will negatively impact the victim’s ability 
to perform at school, administrators can point to academic harm as disruption.244
Further, there is a connection between the speech and the school, because the 
students likely initially met in the schoolyard, see each other at school, and are 
forced to interact within the confines of the classroom environment.  It is possible 
that there are confrontations between the two parties on school grounds as well as 
in cyberspace.  The cyberbully also likely gains insight into what he can use to 
bully his victims inside the classroom, even if he chooses to wait until after hours 
to perpetrate his acts. 
Therefore, if the victim experiences some of the severe effects associated with 
cyberbullying, such as severe depression or fearfulness for safety among others, it 
is likely that the school will be able to step in.  Because the school will be able to 
reasonably forecast disruption under Tinker, and show a nexus between the speech 
and school, if required, they will not violate the First Amendment rights of the cy-
berbully by stopping his or her speech. 
2. Off-Campus Cyberbullying Impinges on the Rights of Other Students to 
Learn in a Safe Environment Within the School 
As with Tinker’s disruption test, school administrators may try to use the im-
pinging on the rights of others test to curtail student cyberbullying.  The case for 
 ________________________  
 240. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 241. See supra Part I.B. 
 242. See supra Parts II.B.1, III.D.1. 
 243. See supra Part I.B (describing the effects of cyberbullying). 
 244. Id.
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school authority to discipline cyberbullies is actually stronger under this prong of 
Tinker than disruption.  In actuality, because of its unique effects on victims and 
the holdings of prior cases, cyberbullying seems to be the perfect vehicle for wide-
spread acceptance of this prong of Tinker.   
The T-shirts worn in Harper and Nixon were passive speech directed at a 
school-wide audience, stating a general opinion on a controversial topic. Compara-
tively, cyberbullying statements are directed specifically at a victim, inflicting var-
ious effects that are natural outgrowths of the bully’s act.245  The effects from the 
targeted statements are much more harmful than any effects experienced by ob-
servers of the T-shirts’ blanket statements.246   
Harper provides educators with additional support, in holding that students 
have a right to be “secure from both physical and psychological attacks” which 
“interfere with their opportunity to learn.”247  Cyberbullying is just such a psycho-
logical attack as was contemplated under Harper, affecting the victim’s very self-
esteem, security, and ability to continue existing relationships.248  Regardless of 
whether the cyberbullying acts occur on- or off-campus, many students clearly 
carry those effects with them into school.  School administrators can point to drop-
ping grades as an interference with the victim’s ability to learn while at school.   
Nixon noted that this impingement claim rested on the rights of other students 
to be “secure and let alone.”249  Cyberbullying victims both attempt to avoid school 
and become preoccupied with avoiding their harasser because they feel as vulnera-
ble to additional attacks at school as they do at home, and fear for their safety.250  
Furthermore, unlike Harper and Nixon schools do not wish to curtail student cy-
berbullying because of any controversial content in the speech.251  Rather, the 
schools’ curtailment is to ensure the well-being of other students, and is based on 
empirical evidence showing that victims of cyberbullying feel unsafe at school.252   
However, both Harper and Nixon involved speech occurring inside the school, 
unlike instances of cyberbullying, which generally occur off-campus.  Thus, the 
school must utilize the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse, which demonstrated 
the unclear boundary between on- and off-campus speech, along with technology, 
which only further blurs that line.253  Under such an analysis, schools can argue that 
 ________________________  
 245. Id. 
 246. While the statements on the student T-shirts in these cases are offensive, particularly to students be-
longing in the group to which the message applies, targeted statements will cause students much more embarrass-
ment and humiliation.  Instead of being passive speech, the directed statements involved in cyberbullying make 
victims feel specifically victimized and inferior, which leads to more severe consequences than the offense taken 
to derogatory blanket statements. 
 247. Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
 248. See supra Part I.B. 
 249. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 
1262 (2007). 
 250. See supra Part I.B. 
 251. See supra Part II.B.2.  Plaintiffs in both cases alleged that the defendant schools curtailed their speech 
because of the political and social controversy surrounding homosexuality and abortion. 
 252. See id. 
 253. See supra Parts II.A and IV.B.2. 
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this distinction between on- and off-campus speech is irrelevant to the cyberbully-
ing analysis, strengthening their use of Harper and Nixon.254
If the school can show that these effects interfere with the rights of students to 
feel safe at school or perform academically, then it should be able to discipline a 
cyberbully for off-campus acts under the second prong of the Tinker test.  Howev-
er, since the disruption test is more universally accepted than Tinker’s impingement 
on the rights of others analysis, schools would be advised to justify curtailment first 
under the disruption prong if they are so able.   
CONCLUSION
Problems with cyberbullying are growing exponentially with the increased 
availability of technology throughout the day, along with the constant accessibility 
to others that such technology brings.255  It is in the best interests of all parties for 
the courts to adopt a test that schools can use to curtail student cyberbullying, even 
when such acts occur off-campus.  Tinker, because of its widespread acceptance 
and adaptability to both cyberspeech and off-campus student speech, will provide 
educators with a well-established line of precedence which they can use in deter-
mining whether they can constitutionally curtail student speech.256  It is time for the 
courts to recognize that the law has failed to keep pace with technology and adopt 
measures to protect today’s students. 
 ________________________  
 254. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 255. See supra Introduction and Part I. 
 256. See supra Part IV.B. 
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